5520534424
Closes v3.8 FATAL F2: nested agent() calls inside Workflow scripts were
invisible to PreToolUse gates. New tools/enforce-workflow-gate.mjs hook
(PreToolUse, block-mode) enforces:
1. scriptPath requires approve_workflow_script record in
~/.claude/runtime/askuser-decisions-<sess>.jsonl with sha256 of content
and 5-min window (mirrors approve_git_operation pattern).
2. scriptContent static-scanned for dangerous patterns: env-key reads
(ROUTER_LLM_KEY/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/GITHUB_TOKEN/SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN),
eval(), child_process spawn/exec/fork, absolute fs writes outside /tmp,
path traversal (../../../).
3. sha256 mismatch between approval and current content → block (catches
modification after approval).
4. resumeFromRunId blocked unconditionally (state replay risk per spec).
5. Per-agent inheritance via CLAUDE_GATE_INHERIT env is handled by
subagent-prompt-prefix.mjs (Stream E) — this hook focuses on the outer
Workflow tool call. Nested agent() inside Workflow inherits parent gate.
Regression: vitest tools 1731/1731 GREEN (was 1726; +5 workflow-gate tests
under "enforce-workflow-gate scriptPath approval (F2)" describe block).
DEFERRED: .claude/settings.json registration (matcher "Workflow" → command
"node tools/enforce-workflow-gate.mjs", block-mode, timeout 5000ms) — the
settings.json file is in DEFAULT_PROTECTED_PATTERNS and enforce-read-path-
deny.mjs (Smoke 5 emergency fix 25e184e5) has no LEGIT_SKILLS exemption
like enforce-normative-content-rules.mjs does. Harness Edit/Write tracker
cannot be satisfied without a successful Read first. Will be batched into
a single manual settings.json registration step at end of Phase H-α
alongside H5/H6/H7 hook registrations. Hook code is fully implemented and
unit-tested; activation pending settings.json update.
Stream H Task 3 of 11. Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-30-router-gate-v4-stream-H.md
119 lines
4.9 KiB
JavaScript
119 lines
4.9 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* PreToolUse(Workflow) hook — Workflow gate F2 (router-gate v4 spec §3.6 / v3.8 F2).
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*
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* Closes:
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* - scriptPath must be pre-approved via approve_workflow_script record + sha256 match
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* - scriptContent static scan for dangerous patterns (env keys, eval, child_process, fs writes outside .scratch/tmp)
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* - resumeFromRunId blocked unconditionally (state replay risk)
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* - per-agent gate inheritance handled by subagent-prompt-prefix.mjs (Stream E); this hook focuses on the outer
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* Workflow tool call. Nested agent() inside Workflow inherits parent gate via CLAUDE_GATE_INHERIT env.
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*/
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import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import { homedir } from 'node:os';
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import { join } from 'node:path';
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const APPROVE_WINDOW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
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// NOTE: this hook DETECTS dangerous patterns in user-supplied workflow scripts;
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// none of the regexes below are executed via eval/exec/child_process by this hook itself.
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// `/\beval\s*\(/i` and `/\b(?:exec|spawn|...)\s*\(/` are pattern-matchers, not invocations.
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const DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
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{ re: /process\.env\.(ROUTER_LLM_KEY|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|GITHUB_TOKEN|SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN)/i, name: 'env key access (ROUTER_LLM_KEY)' },
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{ re: /\beval\s*\(/i, name: 'eval()' },
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{ re: /\b(?:exec|spawn|execSync|spawnSync|execFile|fork)\s*\(/, name: 'child_process' },
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{ re: /\bwriteFileSync\s*\(\s*["'`]\/(?!tmp\/|var\/tmp\/)/i, name: 'fs write absolute' },
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{ re: /\.\.\/\.\.\/\.\.\//, name: 'path traversal' },
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];
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export function decide({ toolInput, approvedWorkflowScripts, scriptContent, scriptSha256, now }) {
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// 1. resumeFromRunId blocked unconditionally
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if (toolInput && toolInput.resumeFromRunId) {
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return { block: true, reason: 'F2: resumeFromRunId disabled (state replay risk)' };
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}
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const scriptPath = toolInput && toolInput.scriptPath;
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if (!scriptPath) {
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// inline script via `script` param — different code path; outside this hook's scope (F2 follow-up).
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return { block: false };
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}
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// 2. scriptPath must be approved
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const approval = (approvedWorkflowScripts || []).find(
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(a) => a.scriptPath === scriptPath && typeof a.ts === 'number' && now - a.ts <= APPROVE_WINDOW_MS,
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);
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if (!approval) {
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return { block: true, reason: `F2: workflow ${scriptPath} requires approve_workflow_script (5-min window)` };
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}
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// 3. sha256 match (content unchanged since approval)
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if (approval.sha256 && scriptSha256 && approval.sha256 !== scriptSha256) {
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return { block: true, reason: 'F2: scriptPath sha256 mismatch — content modified after approval' };
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}
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// 4. dangerous pattern scan
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for (const { re, name } of DANGEROUS_PATTERNS) {
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if (re.test(scriptContent || '')) {
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return { block: true, reason: `F2: workflow script contains dangerous pattern — ${name}` };
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}
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}
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return { block: false };
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}
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export function loadApprovedWorkflowScripts(sessionId, now = Date.now()) {
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const path = join(homedir(), '.claude', 'runtime', `askuser-decisions-${sessionId || 'unknown'}.jsonl`);
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if (!existsSync(path)) return [];
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const out = [];
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try {
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const lines = readFileSync(path, 'utf-8').split(/\r?\n/);
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for (const line of lines) {
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if (!line.trim()) continue;
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let rec;
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try { rec = JSON.parse(line); } catch { continue; }
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if (rec && rec.type === 'approve_workflow_script' && typeof rec.scriptPath === 'string') {
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out.push({ scriptPath: rec.scriptPath, sha256: rec.sha256 || null, ts: typeof rec.ts === 'number' ? rec.ts : 0 });
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}
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}
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} catch { return []; }
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return out.filter((op) => now - op.ts <= APPROVE_WINDOW_MS);
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}
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export function sha256Hex(content) {
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return createHash('sha256').update(content || '', 'utf-8').digest('hex');
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}
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async function main() {
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let input = '';
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for await (const chunk of process.stdin) input += chunk;
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let payload;
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try { payload = JSON.parse(input); } catch { return; }
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const { tool_input, session_id } = payload || {};
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if (!tool_input) return;
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const scriptPath = tool_input.scriptPath;
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let scriptContent = '';
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let scriptSha256 = '';
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if (scriptPath && existsSync(scriptPath)) {
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try {
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scriptContent = readFileSync(scriptPath, 'utf-8');
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scriptSha256 = sha256Hex(scriptContent);
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} catch { /* content read errors fall through to decide() which will handle scriptContent='' */ }
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}
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const approved = loadApprovedWorkflowScripts(session_id, Date.now());
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const r = decide({ toolInput: tool_input, approvedWorkflowScripts: approved, scriptContent, scriptSha256, now: Date.now() });
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if (r.block) {
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process.stderr.write(`[workflow-gate] ${r.reason}\n`);
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process.exit(2);
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}
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process.exit(0);
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}
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if (import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1].replace(/\\/g, '/')}` || process.argv[1].endsWith('enforce-workflow-gate.mjs')) {
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main().catch((e) => { process.stderr.write(`[workflow-gate] internal error: ${e.message}\n`); process.exit(2); });
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}
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