PII filter previously covered only RU phone, email, Sentry, OpenAI token,
and generic Bearer. Several common surface leaks were uncovered:
- JWT tokens (eyJ<base64>.<base64>.<base64>) — auth/session tokens.
- AWS access key IDs (AKIA<16 alphanum>) — IAM static creds.
- Yandex Cloud IAM static keys (AQVN<base64>), session tokens (t1.<base64>),
OAuth tokens (y0_<base64>) — primary cloud-provider for this project.
- IPv4 addresses (dotted-quad) — over-redacts 4-segment build numbers as
an accepted tradeoff (under-redaction is the worse failure).
- Windows user-paths (C:\Users\<name>) → C:\Users\***. Otherwise the OS
username `Administrator` leaks via task_size.files in every episode.
- POSIX /home/<name>/ → /home/***/. Same rationale for Linux dev hosts.
Pattern order: highly-specific token patterns (JWT/AWS/YC) run BEFORE
OPENAI_TOKEN/GENERIC_BEARER fallbacks; otherwise partial overlaps would
strip the wrong segments.
Tests: 9 new (each new pattern + idempotency over the expanded redaction
markers). 27/27 PII tests green.
.gitleaks.toml: added the test fixture to the path allowlist — the file
contains synthetic JWT/AWS/Yandex tokens (the filter is supposed to redact
them), not real secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Дмитрий
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