diff --git a/tools/enforce-router-gate.mjs b/tools/enforce-router-gate.mjs
index 399a58bd..4fcfdb45 100644
--- a/tools/enforce-router-gate.mjs
+++ b/tools/enforce-router-gate.mjs
@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ const SAFE_EXACT = [
   /^composer\s+(?:test|pint|stan|insights|rector)\b/,
   /^(?:\.\/)?vendor\/bin\/pest\b/,
   /^pest\b/,
+  // Narrow `cd app` (2026-05-31, owner-authorized) — enter the Laravel project dir
+  // so already-whitelisted commands (pest, php artisan test) run from app/.
+  // Scope deliberately limited to the literal `app` dir: `cd` into any other path
+  // (incl. protected .claude/runtime, memory/, transcripts) stays default-deny, so
+  // the cwd-shift read-bypass is contained. Mutations remain caught at the
+  // hard-blacklist + chain-mutating rule (both run before the whitelist), and each
+  // chain segment after `cd app &&` must still be independently whitelisted.
+  /^cd\s+app$/,
 ];
 
 export function classifyWhitelist(segments) {
diff --git a/tools/enforce-router-gate.test.mjs b/tools/enforce-router-gate.test.mjs
index 0c9984ed..0207a70d 100644
--- a/tools/enforce-router-gate.test.mjs
+++ b/tools/enforce-router-gate.test.mjs
@@ -227,3 +227,46 @@ describe('SAFE_EXACT — Laravel dev workflow (whitelist expansion 2026-05-30)',
     expect(classifyBashCommand('composer outdated', {}).result).toBe('allow');
   });
 });
+
+describe('SAFE_EXACT — narrow `cd app` whitelist (2026-05-31, owner-authorized)', () => {
+  // Allowed: enter the Laravel project dir, alone or chained with whitelisted cmds
+  it.each([
+    'cd app',
+    'cd app && pest',
+    'cd app && php artisan test',
+    'cd app && composer test',
+  ])('allows %s', (cmd) => {
+    expect(classifyBashCommand(cmd, {}).result).toBe('allow');
+  });
+
+  // Scope: cd into any other dir stays default-deny (cwd-shift read-bypass contained)
+  it.each([
+    'cd ~/.claude/runtime',
+    'cd ../memory',
+    'cd app/storage',
+    'cd /tmp',
+    'cd ..',
+  ])('still blocks cd into non-app dir: %s', (cmd) => {
+    expect(classifyBashCommand(cmd, {}).result).toBe('block');
+  });
+
+  // cwd-shift read-exfil attempt via narrow cd app stays blocked (protected path by name)
+  it('still blocks reading a protected file from app/ via literal path', () => {
+    expect(classifyBashCommand('cd app && cat ../.env', {}).result).toBe('block');
+    expect(classifyBashCommand('cd app && cat ~/.claude/runtime/state.json', {}).result).toBe('block');
+  });
+
+  // Mutations after cd app remain caught (hard-blacklist + chain-mutating rule)
+  it.each([
+    'cd app && rm foo',
+    'cd app && mkdir x',
+    'cd app && git commit -m x',
+  ])('still blocks mutating chain: %s', (cmd) => {
+    expect(classifyBashCommand(cmd, {}).result).toBe('block');
+  });
+
+  // Second segment must still be independently whitelisted
+  it('still blocks cd app chained with a non-whitelisted command', () => {
+    expect(classifyBashCommand('cd app && frobnicate', {}).result).toBe('block');
+  });
+});