/**
 * PreToolUse(Read) wrapper — path-deny for Read tool.
 * Router-gate v4 emergency fix (Smoke 5 2026-05-30).
 *
 * Spec §3.1 declared transcript JSONL hard-deny but Read tool had NO
 * path-protection — controller could Read ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl
 * (parent context exfil from other sessions). Same for runtime artifacts,
 * .env, normative files.
 *
 * Reuses DEFAULT_PROTECTED_PATTERNS from shell-content-rules.mjs.
 * Fail-CLOSE on internal error (security default).
 */
import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
import {
  readStdin,
  parseEventJson,
  exitDecision,
} from './enforce-hook-helpers.mjs';
import { defaultPathNormalize, isProtectedPath, READ_DENY_PATTERNS } from './shell-content-rules.mjs';
import { canonicalAction, escapeGrantOpen, loadFloorEscapes, loadConsumed } from './escape-grant.mjs';
import { logGuardBlock } from './guard-block-log.mjs';

export function decide({ toolName, filePath, escapeGrants = [], escapeConsumed = [], now = Date.now() }) {
  if (toolName !== 'Read') return { block: false, reason: null };
  const fp = String(filePath || '');
  // Path-deny only. Narrow READ_DENY_PATTERNS (not the full DEFAULT_PROTECTED_PATTERNS):
  // Read of CLAUDE.md / normative docs / memory has no exfil value and must stay allowed for
  // the claude-md-management / memory-sync workflow. Only genuine Read-exfil targets —
  // transcripts, runtime, settings, secrets — are blocked. The full protected-list still
  // guards Bash/PowerShell read and Write (over-block fix 2026-05-31).
  // F-1 (аудит 2026-06-07): контент-скан выдачи убран — был МЁРТВ в проде (PreToolUse(Read)-хук,
  // main() не передавал content; контента до чтения нет). Реальный exfil (исходящий payload)
  // закрыт живым enforce-mcp-classification.scanEgress. decide() гейтит строго по пути.
  if (fp && isProtectedPath(fp, defaultPathNormalize, READ_DENY_PATTERNS)) {
    // M7 Фаза 2 (правило 7в): escape владельца снимает Read-блок защищённого пути
    // (страж обязан чтить аварийный выход, как пол/стена/egress). Канон-строка действия —
    // тот же binding-ключ, что владелец вставляет в AskUser-escape.
    const action = canonicalAction('Read', { file_path: fp });
    if (escapeGrantOpen(action, escapeGrants, escapeConsumed, now)) {
      return { block: false, reason: null };
    }
    return {
      block: true,
      reason: `path «${defaultPathNormalize(fp)}» protected against Read (§3.1 transcript/runtime/secrets hard-deny); FLOOR-ESCAPE: ${action}`,
    };
  }
  return { block: false, reason: null };
}

async function main() {
  try {
    const raw = await readStdin();
    const event = parseEventJson(raw);
    const sess = (event && event.session_id) || 'unknown';
    const r = decide({
      toolName: event.tool_name,
      filePath: event.tool_input?.file_path || event.tool_input?.filePath,
      escapeGrants: loadFloorEscapes(sess),
      escapeConsumed: loadConsumed(sess),
    });
    if (r.block) {
      logGuardBlock(event, 'М5 Read-страж', r.reason);
      return exitDecision({ block: true, message: `[read-path-deny] ${r.reason}` });
    }
    return exitDecision({ block: false });
  } catch {
    return exitDecision({ block: true, message: '[read-path-deny] внутренняя ошибка — fail-CLOSE' });
  }
}

const isCli = process.argv[1] && fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === process.argv[1];
if (isCli) main();
