Дмитрий
73 lines
3.6 KiB
JavaScript
73 lines
3.6 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* PreToolUse(Read) wrapper — path-deny for Read tool.
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* Router-gate v4 emergency fix (Smoke 5 2026-05-30).
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*
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* Spec §3.1 declared transcript JSONL hard-deny but Read tool had NO
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* path-protection — controller could Read ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl
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* (parent context exfil from other sessions). Same for runtime artifacts,
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* .env, normative files.
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*
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* Reuses DEFAULT_PROTECTED_PATTERNS from shell-content-rules.mjs.
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* Fail-CLOSE on internal error (security default).
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*/
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
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import {
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readStdin,
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parseEventJson,
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exitDecision,
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} from './enforce-hook-helpers.mjs';
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import { defaultPathNormalize, isProtectedPath, READ_DENY_PATTERNS } from './shell-content-rules.mjs';
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import { canonicalAction, escapeGrantOpen, loadFloorEscapes, loadConsumed } from './escape-grant.mjs';
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import { logGuardBlock } from './guard-block-log.mjs';
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export function decide({ toolName, filePath, escapeGrants = [], escapeConsumed = [], now = Date.now() }) {
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if (toolName !== 'Read') return { block: false, reason: null };
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const fp = String(filePath || '');
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// Path-deny only. Narrow READ_DENY_PATTERNS (not the full DEFAULT_PROTECTED_PATTERNS):
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// Read of CLAUDE.md / normative docs / memory has no exfil value and must stay allowed for
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// the claude-md-management / memory-sync workflow. Only genuine Read-exfil targets —
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// transcripts, runtime, settings, secrets — are blocked. The full protected-list still
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// guards Bash/PowerShell read and Write (over-block fix 2026-05-31).
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// F-1 (аудит 2026-06-07): контент-скан выдачи убран — был МЁРТВ в проде (PreToolUse(Read)-хук,
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// main() не передавал content; контента до чтения нет). Реальный exfil (исходящий payload)
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// закрыт живым enforce-mcp-classification.scanEgress. decide() гейтит строго по пути.
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if (fp && isProtectedPath(fp, defaultPathNormalize, READ_DENY_PATTERNS)) {
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// M7 Фаза 2 (правило 7в): escape владельца снимает Read-блок защищённого пути
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// (страж обязан чтить аварийный выход, как пол/стена/egress). Канон-строка действия —
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// тот же binding-ключ, что владелец вставляет в AskUser-escape.
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const action = canonicalAction('Read', { file_path: fp });
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if (escapeGrantOpen(action, escapeGrants, escapeConsumed, now)) {
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return { block: false, reason: null };
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}
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return {
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block: true,
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reason: `path «${defaultPathNormalize(fp)}» protected against Read (§3.1 transcript/runtime/secrets hard-deny); FLOOR-ESCAPE: ${action}`,
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};
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}
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return { block: false, reason: null };
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}
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async function main() {
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try {
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const raw = await readStdin();
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const event = parseEventJson(raw);
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const sess = (event && event.session_id) || 'unknown';
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const r = decide({
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toolName: event.tool_name,
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filePath: event.tool_input?.file_path || event.tool_input?.filePath,
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escapeGrants: loadFloorEscapes(sess),
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escapeConsumed: loadConsumed(sess),
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});
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if (r.block) {
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logGuardBlock(event, 'М5 Read-страж', r.reason);
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return exitDecision({ block: true, message: `[read-path-deny] ${r.reason}` });
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}
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return exitDecision({ block: false });
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} catch {
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return exitDecision({ block: true, message: '[read-path-deny] внутренняя ошибка — fail-CLOSE' });
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}
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}
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const isCli = process.argv[1] && fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === process.argv[1];
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if (isCli) main();
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